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I. INTRODUCTION
Multijurisdictional practice is now a full-fledged reality. The legal
profession has entered a time in which lawyers have access to a
wealth of information through the rapid increase in technological development. For example, a Florida lawyer vacationing in Europe can
* J.D. with Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2002; B.S., Florida
State University, 1999. Thanks to Martha Barnett for suggesting the importance of this
topic. Thanks also to Keith and my parents for their love and support during this time.
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pull out his Palm Pilot and conduct research for a case pending back
home simply by plugging the device into his cellular phone. Another
lawyer in New York can access the Internet and research just about
any area of the law in any part of the world. With relative speed, he
can learn how to write a will in Oregon or draft articles of incorporation in California. A lawyer can easily contact a friend or partner in
another state via e-mail or telephone and obtain advice regarding the
law in another state. A lawyer can now be on the other side of the
country but make it to a local court in a matter of hours after preparing for her case on a laptop in the airplane.
While out-of-state lawyers arguably are not as “competent” as a
lawyer licensed in a particular state, with enough time and research,
the lawyer who practices wills and trusts law in New York can
quickly become more competent in California wills and trusts law
than the California-licensed lawyer who practices criminal law in
California. Although the legal profession is changing as fast as technology, our laws are not keeping pace.1 State laws of unauthorized
practice primarily govern multijurisdictional practice. Yet these laws
are not compatible with the reality in which we now live. When unauthorized practice of law (UPL) regulations were created at the turn
of the century, legislators and state judges did not have the same
concerns of today’s legal professionals.2 Lawyers generally never
practiced outside of their state.3 It was hard enough to visit family
across the country, much less to get there and conduct sufficient research to become competent with substantially different legal rules.
Nonetheless, states continue to apply these antiquated laws to attorneys practicing in an era of easy transit and mass communication.
States ignore the fact that clients often need their attorneys to advocate their causes in states where their attorneys have no license.
A fundamental principle governing the practice of law today is the
need to “keep up with the times.” Our society no longer has a problem with communication or travel. We have access to the most technologically advanced equipment in the world, as evidenced by the increased use of videoconferencing, the growing trend to work at home
and communicate via computer, or even the ability to obtain a college
degree from a reputable university without leaving home. Law firms
are progressing with the rest of the economy. State laws regulating
1. See generally Bruce A. Green, Assisting Clients With Multi-State and Interstate
Legal Problems: The Need to Bring the Professional Regulation of Lawyers Into the 21st
Century, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-bruce_green_report.html (March 2000).
2. Robert A. Creamer, Private Practitioner Issues With Multijurisdictional Law Practice in Litigation Matters, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-bcreamer.html (March 2000).
3. Joseph R. Lundy, Private Practitioner Problems With Multijurisdictional Law
Practice in Transactional and Other Non-Litigation Matters pt. 5, at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mjp-uplpaper.html (March 2000) (“Most state UPL statutes and rules originated at a time when commerce and law practice were mostly local . . . .”).
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legal practice must change to accommodate the increasingly common
multistate law firm.
This brings up a relatively new concept (that is, within the last
thirty years or so) that has developed to the extent that many states
are now recognizing the need for reform. Multijurisdictional practice
occurs when a lawyer licensed in his or her home state crosses state
boundaries to handle legal matters in a state where he or she is not
licensed. America’s economy is changing rapidly. Businesses, large
and small, are becoming global in nature. With the rapid advancements in technology, businesses easily market their products or services in many countries while never leaving their home state. Lawyers are rapidly following suit. The legal profession must keep up
with the trend in the global economy to enable lawyers to respond to
their clients’ needs in areas away from home. Under current UPL
regulations, lawyers often face sanctions for ethical violations they
were not even aware that they were committing.
Recognizing the need for reform, past-President of the American
Bar Association (ABA) Martha Barnett appointed a Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice to examine the theories plaguing the legal profession in this context today. The Commission exists primarily
to examine the burdens imposed upon the legal profession by current
proscriptions of multijurisdictional practice and to issue a report and
recommendation regarding reform of these rules.4 The Commission’s
proposed changes to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are expected in late 2002. Ultimately, however, states must decide
which course of action to take.5 Many states have already created
committees to analyze the need for reform of these rules; proposals
are expected to arise within the next couple of years.6
Because it is increasingly clear that much-needed changes to this
aspect of lawyer regulation will occur, this Article provides informative material to guide states in their quest to reform their own UPL
laws. Many factors must be considered separately, and all are
equally important. Reforming such a well-established body of law
will require attention to all areas of the law as it currently exists in
light of the fact that it changes every day. While states have the ultimate authority to decide for themselves how the practice of law
should be governed, they should realize that outdated laws can no
longer govern the legal profession.
4. Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjphome.html (last visited March 22, 2002).
5. A state’s sole power to regulate the legal profession usually arises from its state
constitution. Thus, absent constitutional amendment, any action of reform must be taken
by the states.
6. For a list of states that have created such committees and for a discussion of their
present actions, see http://www.crossingthebar.com (last edited March 19, 2002).
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This Article discusses the need for reform and describes potential
solutions. Part II discusses the primary problems with current UPL
regulations in light of our changing economy. Part III then examines
the areas of the legal profession that must be addressed to propose
the most effective reform and suggests what information is necessary
for states to make an informed decision. New rules will not succeed
unless each interest is adequately considered and accounted for. Part
III also discusses the constitutional rights of states, consumers, and
lawyers that must be balanced in a reformed body of law. Next, Part
IV discusses the most prominently suggested avenues of reform,
ranging from a national perspective to state-based reform. One of
these suggestions, or a combination of proposals, will likely best suit
the individual states. Part V then proposes concepts regarding what
the author believes most likely to succeed in meeting the modern and
future needs of the legal profession. Finally, Part VI briefly discusses
the next steps that should be taken to fulfill the needs of the legal
profession in the context of all rules of professional conduct.
A lawyer seeking an interstate practice should no longer worry
about potential criminal sanctions or the possibility of not collecting
his fees simply by representing a frequent client in matters involving
another state’s laws. While lawyers should certainly not be free to
practice whatever they want whenever they want, they should not be
precluded from taking advantage of the increasingly global economy
in which we now live. They should not be excluded from areas in
which other countries (those of the European Union in particular)
have successfully entered. We are one of, if not the most, technologically advanced nations in the world; the legal profession should be
able to take full advantage of that technological prowess.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF UPL AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Defining “The Practice of Law”
Before determining which legal services are unauthorized, courts
must define the practice of law.7 State courts have defined it in a
variety of ways—all resulting in different conclusions depending
upon the specific factual scenario. While it is easy to generally conclude, as most courts and legal commentators do, that the practice
of law is “what lawyers do,”8 this definition is useless when the
practices of the legal profession overlap with other professions.9
7. Robert D. Welden, Defining “The Practice of Law”—Untying the Gordian Knot,
WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Jan. 2001, at 41, available at http://www.wsba.org/barnews/2001/
01/welden.htm.
8. See, e.g., State v. Chamberlain, 232 P. 337, 338 (Wash. 1925).
9. This is particularly true with regard to the increasing phenomenon of the accounting profession providing legal services. While accountants are not violating any of their
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Some courts define the practice of law simply, such as “the rendering of legal advice . . . and holding oneself out to be a lawyer.”10
Consequently, such advice or service must be rendered to a client.11
Others define the practice of law to consist “in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court.”12 Such activities necessarily involve a high
degree of legal skill and a great adaptation to complex situations.13
A more recent definition entails “sufficient contact with [a client] to
render the nature of the legal service a clear legal representation.”14
Ultimately, however, the practice of law is established separately
by each state on a case-by-case basis and varies from one jurisdiction to another.15
Broadly defining the practice of law often proves too tough a task
for state courts to accomplish consistently. Courts have long recognized that “attempts to define the practice of law in terms of enumerating the specific types of services that come within the phrase
are fruitless because new developments in society, whether legislative, social, or scientific in nature, continually create new concepts
and new legal problems.”16 Thus, most states define the practice of
law in terms of what it is not—in terms of what constitutes a violation for the unauthorized practice of law. Therein lies the problem.
While courts recognize that the practice of law changes daily, states
continue to operate under UPL definitions created at the turn of the
century. Such definitions simply do not fulfill their purpose as the legal profession increasingly and unavoidably becomes multijurisdictional in nature.
Since the founding of our Republic, states have had the exclusive
authority to license and regulate their lawyers.17 States have regurules of professional conduct, an attorney performing the same type of services could be
violating the rules of professional conduct in a state in which he is not licensed. See also
Anthony E. Davis, Multijurisdictional Practice by Transactional Lawyers—Why the Sky
Really Is Falling, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-adavis.html (March 2000) (recognizing
that accounting firms may be only a step away from providing legal services, which is significant because they are free to practice without restriction across state lines).
10. El Gemayel v. Seaman, 533 N.E.2d 245, 248 (N.Y. 1988). But cf. Fought & Co.,
Inc. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 495-98 (Haw. 1998) (providing legal services as consultant is not practicing law within a foreign jurisdiction); Shapiro v.
Steinberg, 440 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that not everything an attorney
does to help with a case constitutes the practice of law).
11. El Gemayel, 533 N.E.2d at 248.
12. Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 163 (N.D. 1986) (quoting Cain v. Merchs.
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 268 N.W. 719, 722 (N.D. 1936)).
13. Id.
14. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5
(Cal. 1998).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2001).
16. Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 495 (Haw. 1998) (citing S. REP. NO. 700, at 661 (1955); H.R. REP. NO. 612, at 783 (1955)).
17. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979).
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lated their lawyers by prescribing the qualifications for admission to
practice law within the state and by creating disciplinary rules to
govern legal practice once the lawyer is admitted.18 State disciplinary
rules, also known as rules of professional conduct, regulate every aspect of the legal profession. The focus of this Article, rules regulating
UPL, is only one aspect of this body of regulations. Generally, the basic premise of UPL regulations is that only lawyers licensed in the
state (having passed that state’s bar examination) are authorized to
practice law within the state.19 A lawyer who is licensed in another
state and competent to practice law is subject to sanctions if he practices law within a state in which he is not licensed. As will be discussed, most of these rules have exceptions, such as a pro hac vice
rule for litigators or reciprocity arrangements between states where
a lawyer need simply apply to practice within the state. However, as
the law becomes increasingly global, UPL laws are becoming unclear
and the conflict among jurisdictions great.
B. Concerns With Current UPL Regulations
1. Current UPL Regulations Are Outdated
and Sporadically Enforced
Although originally enacted to protect lawyers’ private interests,20
the primary reason currently given by courts and lawmakers for the
regulation of UPL is to protect consumers.21 States assume, and perhaps at one time rightly so, that lawyers who have not fulfilled a
state’s admissions requirements are not competent to practice law
within that state. As a result, clients will be harmed and malpractice
will ensue.22 However, the legal profession as it exists today does not
pose the same sort of problems it once did. Most UPL laws were
passed between the 1870s and the 1920s.23 At that time, the stringent requirements were easily justified because most client matters
did not extend beyond the licensing state’s boundaries, and lawyers
could not easily learn the law of another jurisdiction. One would not
18. Id.
19. For a survey of state laws regulating multijurisdictional practice, see Attorneys’
Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Statutes and Rules Limiting Multijurisdictional Law
Practice From 51 United States Jurisdictions, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjpuplrules.html (March 2000).
20. Welden, supra note 7.
21. See, e.g., Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 1995) (citing Fla.
Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1978)); Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d
161, 163 (N.D. 1986).
22. See generally John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law
Firm: Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 967 (1995).
23. Welden, supra note 7. The Model Code and Model Rules were passed later but
essentially kept the same definition.
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question a licensed lawyer’s competence over that of an unlicensed
lawyer. This is no longer the case; however, although client needs
and legal practices have changed, the law has not adapted with
them.24
Most states broadly define UPL as “[p]ractic[ing] law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in
that jurisdiction.”25 The rest is left to judicial determination.26 The
problem now plaguing the legal profession is states’ inconsistent interpretation of this general definition. Every court has its own criteria or test to determine whether the practice of law by an out-of-state
lawyer is unauthorized, and these tests are rarely in accordance with
one another.
Additionally, states enforce these regulations sporadically and
courts rarely construe them.27 As a result, lawyers have no idea
whether they are violating the law. They are not aware that their
everyday conduct could potentially subject them to sanctions as
harsh as criminal penalties. For the sake of consumers and lawyers
and the smooth operation of the legal profession in modern society, a
clearer standard must be applied.
2. Defining the Required Level of “Competence”
With the ultimate goal of protecting clients, states are primarily
concerned with lawyers’ “competency.” ABA Model Rule 1.1 requires
that all lawyers provide competent representation to their clients.28
Competence is defined as requiring the “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”29 Again, what is “reasonable” or “necessary” is not consistently
construed. The Comment to the Rule provides various factors to consider in determining competence, yet none of these factors are contingent upon a lawyer’s license within a particular state.30 Additionally, the current definition continues to assume that an unlicensed
lawyer is incompetent to practice law in that state without a chance
to prove otherwise. The definition of competence ultimately depends

24. Green, supra note 1.
25. UPL, at http://www.crossingthebar.com/upl.htm (last edited Dec. 27, 2001); see
also Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society, Inc., supra note 19.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2001).
27. Green, supra note 1.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. Such factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature
of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the
field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the particular field. Id.
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upon the particular factual scenario and the court faced with the
scenario.
This is not to say that competence is not an important, if not the
most important, factor in determining whether an unlicensed lawyer
should be permitted to practice within a state. Rather, when considering the level of competence required of an out-of-state lawyer, the
standard must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration the attorney’s background in the area of law in question.31 The general definition of competence in this context should not
preclude an unlicensed lawyer from practicing within the state as
long as the lawyer proves adequate knowledge of local law and that
his practice requires entrance into that state. Competence requires a
necessary level of skill and experience in a particular area. The legislature or the state bar should define it in a way that courts can adequately and consistently fulfill the criterion’s purpose, recognizing
the capability and increasing necessity of out-of-state lawyers to
quickly become competent in local law. Otherwise the primary justification for UPL laws is rendered unenforceable and useless. The law
as it currently stands is overbroad.
3. Current Law Does Not Differentiate Between Lawyers
and Nonlawyers
States’ prohibitions of nonlicensed lawyers from practicing in
their jurisdiction make no distinction between lawyers who are competent and licensed in another jurisdiction and those who have never
attended law school.32 Such a stringent prohibition is not feasible in
today’s multijurisdictional legal environment. For example, such a
broad definition cannot apply equally to someone who has practiced
law in another state for twenty years and a layperson who has never
attended law school but is misleadingly holding himself out as a lawyer. The lawyer licensed in another state may be an expert in her
particular area of law yet precluded from assisting her client in a
matter in another state. If the lawyer is not required to appear in
court, there is no formal mechanism for that lawyer to be admitted,
even temporarily, to that state. Again, this restriction is unnecessarily overbroad.
4. Current Law Restricts Free Trade
Current UPL laws also do not take clients’ needs into consideration. In reality, we do not live or do business in isolation within strict

31. E.g., In re Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193, 198 (N.J. 1966) (stating that “questions
of unlawful practice will turn on the particular facts presented”).
32. Creamer, supra note 2.

2002]

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE

1347

geopolitical boundaries.33 Even personal matters now transcend state
or national lines. Thus, the current state of the law creates a tension
between the right of a client to choose his counsel and the right of a
state to control the activities of lawyers practicing within its boundaries.34 Courts are quick to recognize such problems, yet states are reluctant to respond with a solution. In the interest of protecting the
public, one court has stated that the “legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations
upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or
upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of
his choice in all matters including [appearance before a tribunal].”35
Nonetheless, the problems cannot be cured until current rules are
amended.
Some organizations argue that by restricting a client’s right to
choose counsel, current UPL regulations violate the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.36 The Commerce Clause prohibits
states from placing burdens on interstate commerce, thereby restricting free trade.37 By burdening a client’s right to seek assistance of
counsel outside of his or her home state even in nonlitigation contexts, “the[se] rule[s] impair[] the provision of the most effective, efficient, and economical legal services by attorneys involved in the interstate practice of law to clients engaged in interstate commerce.”38
The rules arguably violate two primary standards of the Commerce
Clause: they discriminate against interstate commerce by favoring
local counsel against interstate competitors, and they burden interstate commerce by making it more expensive and difficult for interstate clients to obtain desired counsel.39
Our economy functions under the concept of free trade. Laws exist
to promote competition and to prevent monopolies among businesses
in the interest of consumers.40 By preventing one company from monopolizing the entire market in one region, that company is forced to
compete with surrounding companies, thus resulting in lower prices
and better service. The same can be said of the legal profession.41
33. In re Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
34. Id.
35. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 6
(Cal. 1998) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-9).
36. It is important to note that while this argument is relevant for this discussion, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.
37. Assoc. Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646 (1994).
38. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon
& Frank v. ESQ Business Serv., 525 U.S. 920 (1998) (No. 97-1798), available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-birbrower.html.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975) (stating that the
practice of law has a “business aspect”).
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While the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens
from incompetent lawyers, preventing all interstate practice is overbroad. Consumers seeking legal services should be permitted to
choose their counsel as they wish, subject to reasonable state regulations. Additionally, the increasing need of lawyers to provide effective
assistance of counsel to their existing interstate clients requires that
states eliminate the unnecessary barriers to interstate practice.42
5. Current Laws Are Uncertain, Unclear,
and Differ Substantially
Although most state rules are somewhat similar in requiring a
license to practice law, most states differ substantially as to what
constitutes UPL.43 As a result, most lawyers are not aware that
they could be violating the law.44 For example, states conflict as to
whether the practice of law is unauthorized when a lawyer not licensed within the state is practicing purely federal law.45 While
states have exclusive authority over the activities of lawyers
within their borders involving state law, federal law governs who
may practice in federal courts.46 However, this general rule is
blurred depending upon which type of federal law is at issue.47
Furthermore, even the states that do recognize an exception to
state rules governing attorneys who practice only federal issues
differ as to associated issues, such as whether attorneys can actu42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 cmt. b (1998).
43. Green, supra note 1.
44. E.g., Tamara Loomis, Unauthorized Practice: Many Lawyers Do Not Know They
Are in Violation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 2001.
45. In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 674 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (finding federal exception not sharply defined). The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963), stating that when Congress has explicitly permitted federal
regulation, it preempts state law. However, courts do not consistently construe this case,
resulting in substantial conflict. Compare In re Poole, 222 F.3d 618, 620, 622 (9th Cir.
2000) (stating in dicta that “[a]dmission to practice law before a state’s courts and admission to practice before the federal courts in that state are separate, independent privileges”
and that “practice before federal courts is not governed by state court rules”), with Rittenhouse v. Delta Home Improvement, Inc., 255 B.R. 294 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (stating that both
state and federal law may apply to attorneys practicing in a federal court).
46. But cf. Rittenhouse, 255 B.R. 294 (stating that relevant state and federal rules
govern different spheres of conduct and generally complement each other, and noting that
state law must yield only when incompatible with federal law). This sentiment, however,
has been challenged and ultimately appears to depend upon which area of federal law is at
issue and whether Congress has explicitly given federal courts the power to make regulations. If so, federal law preempts. If not, it does not. See generally Sperry, 373 U.S. 379.
Nonetheless, courts do not consistently apply these principles.
47. For example, what is basically a federal claim may have incidental issues that involve state law. Consider patent law versus bankruptcy law. Patent law involves exclusively federal law and is controlled exclusively by federal regulations. See Sperry, 373 U.S.
at 384-86. However, bankruptcy law can coincide with state law in some circumstances, although a practicing attorney could view these state matters as merely incidental to her
federal practice and decide that they do not apply.
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ally maintain offices in the state when only admitted to practice in
the district.48 Most lawyers are not aware of these fine distinctions
when practicing federal law. They do not hesitate to enter another
state to practice because they are not concerned with state law.
Nonetheless, unbeknownst to these lawyers, they could be subject
to criminal penalties for violating local UPL rules for reasons that
vary among jurisdictions.
Additionally, UPL laws diverge with regard to the frequency of
contact a lawyer has with the state. Some lawyers enter states
only on rare occasions when an existing client matter requires it.
Other lawyers who have clients with more global matters, however, are frequently required to enter another jurisdiction. While
most courts agree that frequent practice within state boundaries
requires something more than a simple request for admittance,49
the frequency of practice required is unclear and depends upon
very particular circumstances.50 Lawyers need to know when they
are to comply with local law. Moreover, if the states are in fact
concerned with protecting consumers, current UPL regulations are
unrealistic. A lawyer who frequently enters the state is undoubtedly more competent regarding that state’s laws than the lawyer
who only rarely enters. Yet existing exceptions to UPL regulations
permitting a lawyer to be temporarily admitted in the state make
it easier for the infrequent visitor to be temporarily admitted than

48. For example, courts have held that an out-of-state lawyer is not precluded from
practicing federal law within a foreign state subject to federal court rules and not subject
to state rules. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 1966); Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1998).
However, while this is the general law, it has been held not to apply to lawyers who maintain an office in the foreign state to practice purely federal issues. Some courts have noted
in these situations that the federal exception rule does not apply because the lawyer may
be inclined to advise clients only on federal issues when more feasible state law alternatives may be the appropriate choice of action. Additionally, clients seeking assistance from
these lawyers are unaware that their lawyer may only assist with federal issues. See In re
Lite Ray Realty Corp., 257 B.R. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v.
Harris-Smith, 737 A.2d 567 (Md. Ct. App. 1999); cf. In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665 (stating
that attorney may maintain an office and practice law within a state in which the attorney
is not licensed as long as matters are limited to federal matters pending in federal court,
but also noting the important difference between maintaining an office to litigate federal
matters and maintaining an office to practice law generally). Lawyers may not realize that
courts have distinguished general federal practice and litigating federal issues in the district court. The law differs with regard to whether the lawyer maintains an office to attract
new clients or to assist existing clients with issues that arise in that district.
49. See, e.g., In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103 (N.J. 2000).
50. Compare Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1 (finding that representation of one matter constituted UPL), and Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965) (finding lawyer violated UPL
laws even though conduct consisted of an isolated event), with In re Estate of Waring, 221
A.2d 193 (N.J. 1966) (holding that isolated representation did not constitute UPL), and El
Gemayel v. Seaman, 533 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1988) (finding contacts insufficient to constitute
UPL).
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the lawyer who has become thoroughly competent in that state’s
law.51
Other areas of concern exist with regard to whether a lawyer
can maintain an office in the state,52 the activity of a lawyer who
resides in the state but is not licensed there,53 and the practices of
a large multistate firm.54 Opinions construing these issues turn on
the particular facts of the case and usually involve the uncertain
quandary of whether the attorney was “practicing law.” Consequently, such issues should be considered so that attorneys will be
aware of specific activity that is considered unauthorized. Current
UPL regulations do not touch the surface of these problems.
Most lawyers accused of UPL are not doing so intentionally—
they simply do not believe that what they are doing is unauthorized. Examples are prevalent in large multistate firms. Many
large firms in the United States have offices in several states. The
lawyers in these firms are licensed in the state of the office in
which they work but not in every state in which the firm has an
office. Thus if an associate travels to another office to assist with a
case, the associate is most likely violating that state’s UPL regulations.55 On the contrary, however, if that associate were researching the same matter from his or her home office and never actually entered the state, the associate’s behavior would not be unauthorized.56 Such a fine distinction is illogical. On the one hand, an
attorney’s conduct is not unauthorized for giving advice to a client
on a foreign issue as long as the attorney does not leave his home
state. Yet, on the other hand, the attorney violates local rules by
51. See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 983(a) (stating that repeated appearances can be cause for
denial of application); FLA. R. JUDICIAL ADMIN. 2.061(a) (stating that denial may be justified after more than three appearances within one year); D.C. CT. OF APP. R. 49(c)(7)(i)
(stating that an attorney cannot apply more than five times per calendar year absent exceptional circumstances). While denial for repeated appearances may be justified under
current rules because those who repeatedly appear are likely to be attempting to forego
current requirements, this is nonetheless an area that needs to be addressed for reform.
52. Compare Perlah v. S.E.I. Corp., 612 A.2d 806 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), and Ranta v.
McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986), with Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La.
1968) (applying state law), and Fla. Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978).
53. Compare Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995), with Petition of
Waters, 447 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1968).
54. Compare Fla. Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1981), with N.Y. Criminal &
Civil Courts Bar Ass’n v. Jacoby, 460 N.E.2d 1325 (N.Y. 1984).
55. This fine distinction often depends upon whether the lawyer is considered to be
“in” the state. Compare Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1, with Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Eng’g &
Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487 (Haw. 1998).
56. E.g., Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 2, 5-6 (rejecting the notion that state UPL regulations
apply to services that an out-of-state law firm renders from its home state). But see In re
Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that if the
goal is to protect the consumer, it should make no difference from where the out-of-state
lawyer is practicing state law, since the level of incompetence of the lawyer is precisely the
same).
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entering the other state to meet with his client directly to give the
same advice. Multijurisdictional lawyers cannot operate blindly,
hoping that a particular court will construe the facts in their favor.
6. Severity of Sanctions
States authorize a variety of sanctions for violation of their UPL
regulations.57 Such penalties include the denial of fees, fines up to
$10,000,58 conviction of a misdemeanor, up to two years in jail, or all
of the above.59 Because of the concerns discussed above, although the
penalty for violation may be similar among states, the point at which
the penalty will be imposed is not. As lawyers are not aware that
their conduct is unauthorized, they are also not aware that their
conduct could be considered criminal.
The most common form of sanction for UPL is the denial of fees.
While this may not seem too harsh a penalty, imagine the lawyer
who expended substantial time and resources defending a client only
to discover that the work will not be compensated. That attorney
likely had no idea that he was violating any rule. For an even more
frightening scenario, imagine in-house counsel entering a state to
advise its corporate client—unknowingly and unintentionally violating the law—and receiving one to two years of jail time.
Current sanctions may be legitimate considering the consequences
that could result when an incompetent lawyer handles a case, particularly a person with no legal experience who is defrauding courts
and consumers. However, these consequences are not prevalent in
every situation. Indeed, such harsh sanctions are rarely justified in
situations involving actual lawyers. Sanctions should be imposed
only where necessary to fulfill the state’s ultimate purpose of protecting its citizens. By reforming UPL laws, sanctions will only be imposed in situations necessitating such penalties, and lawyers will be
aware when their conduct violates such laws.
III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN PROPOSING A CHANGE
A. The Need to Address All Categories of Lawyers
Before accepting proposals for reform, states must consider important distinctions among practice areas. For example, while pro hac
vice rules may suffice with regard to litigators wishing to appear before the tribunal, the rule does not address litigators’ need, for exam57. E.g., UPL Sanctions, at http://www.crossingthebar.com/upl-quickreference.htm
(last edited Dec. 27, 2001).
58. Id. (Pennsylvania).
59. Id. (Louisiana).
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ple, to conduct a deposition within the state. On the same note, the
needs of litigators are substantially different than the needs of
transactional lawyers or in-house counsel. According to current rules,
a transactional lawyer cannot even visit a client’s office within a
state to meet with and advise the client without violating UPL regulations. Each separate category within the legal profession must be
addressed to implement a comprehensive, workable rule. Rules
should be specific enough to account for each type of lawyer’s needs
to effectively conduct his or her practice across state lines. The following are the major categories of concern regarding UPL regulations. Each will be considered separately.
1. Litigators
Litigators are currently the only group of lawyers that have an
explicit exception to practice law within another state’s jurisdiction.
Pro hac vice rules permit a lawyer simply to apply for admittance to
practice in that jurisdiction for a particular case.60 These rules, however, are not comprehensive. Pro hac vice rules apply only to admit
lawyers to appear in court.61 They do not apply when a lawyer needs
to participate in prelitigation activities such as taking a deposition or
conducting discovery in another state.62 Often, the lawyer need only
conduct a deposition and does not need to actually appear before a
judge. In these cases, the lawyer is not protected from current UPL
regulations.
Additionally, pro hac vice regulations are far from uniform among
jurisdictions. States impose many different types of restrictions or
character inquiries before admitting a lawyer to practice in just one
case.63 There are varying limits on the number of cases in which a
lawyer may participate, and states differ as to whether a formal pro
hac vice mechanism applies to hearings in front of administrative
bodies. Thus, lawyers are unaware of the point at which they should
apply for pro hac vice admission—at the outset of the litigation or
when the lawyer discovers that she must appear before a court.
While current pro hac vice rules may suffice for admittance to appear in front of a tribunal, the other needs of litigators need to be addressed. Some recommend that pro hac vice rules be relaxed to permit counsel to handle prelitigation matters under pro hac vice ad-

60. Peter R. Jarvis, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: One Litigator’s View
of Multijurisdictional Practice Issues and Related Policy Questions, at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mjp-pjarvis.html (last visited March 22, 2002).
61. Green, supra note 1.
62. Id.
63. Jarvis, supra note 60.
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mission.64 However, situations frequently arise in which application
for pro hac vice admission may be unnecessary and cumbersome, as
when the lawyer needs only limited contact with the state.65 This,
too, should be considered.
2. Transactional Lawyers
This category includes regular transactional lawyers and other
nonlitigators. There are no rules exempting lawyers from UPL sanctions when the lawyer does not need to appear in front of a tribunal.
Thus the lawyer is precluded from advising a client from another
state,66 negotiating a contract for a foreign client,67 assisting in real
estate or other personal matters,68 or otherwise fully participating in
a client’s legal matters within another jurisdiction.
3. Corporate Counsel
The problems facing in-house counsel are probably the most acute.
Corporations expand or relocate frequently. Consequently, corporate
counsel is often required to move with them into different jurisdictions.69 If not required to actually move, counsel is often required to
handle the many global matters facing a modern-day corporation.
Only eleven U.S. jurisdictions have corporate counsel rules separate from their UPL regulations that create a special exception permitting corporate counsel to practice law within their state.70 Eight
jurisdictions permit in-house counsel to practice within their state as
an exception to their UPL regulations.71 The remaining jurisdictions
do not differentiate corporate counsel from other forms of UPL, including that of laypersons.72 This is important because the scope of
an in-house counsel’s employment is practically indefinable. An in64. ABA Section of Litigation: Preliminary Position Statement on MultiJurisdictional Practice, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-comm_sl.html (June 2001)
[hereinafter ABA Section of Litigation].
65. Id.
66. E.g., Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965); see also Davis, supra note 9.
67. E.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1998); see also Davis, supra note 9.
68. E.g., In re Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); In re
Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1966); see also Lundy, supra note 3.
69. Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, Multijurisdictional Practice Issues, at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-fordham.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
70. Corporate Counsel, at http://www.crossingthebar.com/ corporate_counsel.htm (last
edited Dec. 27, 2001). The twelve jurisdictions are Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington. Id.; see also ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Corporate Admissions Standards, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-uplchart.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
71. Corporate Counsel, supra note 70. The eight jurisdictions are Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
Id.
72. Id.
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house counsel’s day-to-day duties involve, but are not limited to, advising clients on litigation matters, transactional matters, matters
relating to their national and international business practices, areas
of federal and state regulation, the supervision of outside counsel,
and the internal management of day-to-day client legal work.73 Other
in-house attorneys are specialists. Some of their practice fields involve purely federal issues that (should) have nothing to do with licensure in a particular state. Thus in-house counsel are more likely
to practice law in other jurisdictions and least likely to know in advance which UPL regulations will apply to them.
Additionally, the desire to protect clients in this context is not
completely justified. Corporations are sophisticated consumers. They
have the resources and expertise with which to investigate a lawyer’s
background and the competence to make an intelligent decision regarding legal counsel. They realize that corporate counsel often will
not be licensed in more than one state. If legal matters transcend
state boundaries and involve state law, the corporation will realize
that the attorney will have to expend extra time to become competent
in the law of that state. Thus corporations as consumers do not need
the same kinds of protection as an average client.
4. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The primary conflict among states regarding UPL and alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) is whether ADR actually constitutes the
practice of law.74 ADR is an alternative method to resolve disputes,
often without litigation. It is arguably not a manner in which to practice law. Yet some courts have held that ADR constitutes the practice
of law for UPL purposes.75
Arbitrators and mediators are not required to be lawyers. Similarly, lawyers who serve as arbitrators or mediators should not be
considered to be practicing law—they are neutral third parties whose
role is to assist disputants in reaching a resolution.76 The line is less
clear regarding the advocates who participate with their clients in a
form of ADR. For example, some advocates choose a different venue
for purposes of neutrality.77 States should determine whether ADR

73. Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, supra note 69.
74. See, e.g., Diane Leigh Babb, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State
Lines: The Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L.
REV. 535, 546-47 (1999).
75. See, e.g., In re Creasy, 12 P.3d 214 (Ariz. 2000); Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon &
Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 1998); see also Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Brown, 584 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on UPL 1992).
76. Letter from American Arbitration Association to ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, at http://abanet.org/cpr/mjp-comm_aaa.html (June 15, 2001).
77. Id.
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should be considered UPL and, if so, whether they should provide an
exception to the UPL regulations. In making this determination,
states should note the positive effects ADR has had on the legal profession and its success in promoting peaceful settlement of claims,
thereby allowing courts to focus on more pressing matters. ADR
should be promoted throughout the legal community as a successful
alternative for handling disputes. Current UPL regulations prohibit
such activity.
California provides a recent example of a state taking action in
this context. In Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court,78 the California Supreme Court held that ADR fell
within California’s UPL laws and refused to create an arbitration exception. In response, the California Legislature enacted a new statute allowing out-of-state lawyers to conduct arbitrations within the
state for a fee to be collected by the state bar.79 This statute, as initially enacted, was temporary and was to be automatically repealed
on January 1, 2001.80 However, in the 2000 legislative session, the
California Legislature extended the statute’s operative term until
2006.81
B. Constitutional Interests Must Be Balanced
1. States’ Interests
States have always had the exclusive authority to regulate the activity of their lawyers.82 Consequently, there is no right of federal
origin permiting an attorney to practice law in a state without meeting that state’s admissions requirements.83 States exercise their
authority with the primary concern of protecting their citizens.84
Thus, states preclude persons from representing their citizens
without proper training. With regard to out-of-state lawyers, states
view the proper training as successful completion of their bar exam.
While protecting citizens’ rights is certainly a legitimate interest,
some commentators argue that state regulation does not protect the
public. One commentator argues that state regulation actually defies
common sense, particularly in the age of the Internet.85 He argues
that there is no public interest in protecting citizens from actual law-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (1999); see also Creamer, supra note 2.
Creamer, supra note 2.
Stats. 2000, c. 1011, § 2, in subd. (j).
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979).
Id. at 443.
Green, supra note 1.
Davis, supra note 9.
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yers—that such prohibitions actually demean the purpose of the
regulation.86 The states’ motives arguably are purely monopolistic.87
2. Clients’ (Consumers’) Interests
Perhaps the most common argument against current UPL regulation with regard to clients’ interests is that it infringes upon a consumer’s constitutional right to choose counsel. This situation arises
most often where a client has used the same lawyer before and is
comfortable with that person.
While some states permit out-of-state lawyers to practice within a
foreign jurisdiction, this flexibility is often contingent upon the retention of local counsel.88 Some argue that this is an extremely costly,
time-consuming, and disruptive requirement.89 Most clients choose
lawyers who they trust. Not only are these lawyers familiar with the
intricacies of the client’s matter, but they are also likely to fulfill the
requirement of local counsel merely to serve as a “front man.” Lawyers, particularly those with more experience, are arguably less
likely to actually refer to the local counsel for anything other than
what time to appear in court.90 Thus the client’s interests are not further protected; instead, his or her money is wasted.
3. Lawyers’ Interests
There are generally two schools of thought in evaluating lawyers’
interest in UPL. On one side are lawyers who resist reform arguably
to prevent further competition and protect local practice.91 At the
other are lawyers whose matters require that they be able to enter a
jurisdiction more freely without a license.
When it comes to restricting the practices of the legal profession,
lawyers’ motives are often viewed with suspicion.92 Lawyers who assist in implementing current UPL regulations are accused of “protecting their turf” from competition from larger, out-of-state firms.
Consumer protection must actually be a sincere motivation—
evidenced by laws that truly fulfill this purpose and do not merely
prohibit others from participating.93 Those who doubt the validity of
“consumer protection” accuse such lawyers of protecting their fran-

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Creamer, supra note 2.
E.g., Lundy, supra note 3.
Babb, supra note 74, at 550.
Id.
Welden, supra note 7.
Id.
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chise, “whatever the cost, burden, inconvenience, and disruption to
clients who may be denied their choice of counsel.”94
Lawyers promoting reform have an interest in growing at the
same pace as their clients. Law firms are not just service providers;
they are also businesses. There is no need for the economy to progress and the legal profession to stand still. Firms must be able to
protect their clients’ interests to their fullest capacity. They also need
assurance that they will not have to refer their clients to various
lawyers in various states when a foreign issue arises.
IV. SUGGESTED AVENUES OF REFORM
A. National Reform
Proponents of national reform suggest that all current problems
with UPL regulations be remedied by a national, uniform standard.95
The first step to implement such reform is to create a national bar
responsible for developing a uniform definition of what it means to
practice law within a jurisdiction and what is clearly unauthorized.96
This definition must be fluid enough to encompass potential changes
in the legal profession. The next step will be to provide “safe harbors”
outlining exceptions to the general rule of unauthorized practices.
Such exceptions should take into account the varying needs of lawyers and the frequency with which they enter other jurisdictions. Finally, the rule should take into account the ability of a lawyer to
practice law “in” a state without ever actually entering the state—
that is, via communications technology.97 The national bar, rather
than the individual states, would also be responsible for disciplining
lawyers in violation of the rule. It could determine whether federal or
state courts would enforce national standards.
Such an example to consider is the success of the European Union
(EU) Model. This model permits lawyers from any of the EU’s fifteen
member states98 to cross jurisdictional boundaries and practice
within another EU country. The attorney practices in the other country under his home-state title (e.g., solicitor) and may do so on a

94. Creamer, supra note 2.
95. For a thorough analysis of arguments for and against national reform, see Fred C.
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).
96. Green, supra note 1.
97. Id.
98. The EU member states consist of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice
in the European Union: Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT’L LAW. 307, 307 n.1 (2000).
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permanent basis.99 The attorney is required only to register in the
member country.100 Upon completion, the attorney may advise clients
with regard to home and host state law, international law, and EU
law.101 Registered attorneys are subject to the disciplinary rules of
both the home and host countries.102
The EU adopted this directive after recognizing the dramatic increase in cross-border activity similar to that of the U.S.103 The EU
model has effectively permitted attorneys to fully assist their clients
even though the attorney is not a resident of the country he or she is
visiting.104 While the laws of the member countries may vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the EU has recognized the
need for uniformity in a multijurisdictional setting, and the benefits
have proven to outweigh the costs of not being grounded in a particular jurisdiction.105 EU lawyers may now practice in almost all fields of
law in the EU community, represent clients on a continuous basis,
and form multinational law firms with offices in any desired member
state.106
Enforcing a national standard would also change the way lawyers
are admitted to practice law. Some commentators have suggested a
national registration process requiring the creation of a national bar
association to regulate interjurisdictional practice.107 A national registry would enable every lawyer admitted in any state to be registered nationally automatically.108 Under this system, states would
then develop their own system of separate registration.109 Another
suggested alternative includes a national bar examination, successful
passage of which would permit the attorney to “practice in federal
courts, engage in services not before a tribunal, and practice in the
courts of any state on a limited basis until proving knowledge of local
law.”110 Finally, another commentator suggests a model uniform UPL

99. Council Directive 98/5, 1998 O.J. (L 77/36); see also William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Multi-Jurisdiction Practice and the Conflict of Laws, at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-wreynolds.html (2000).
100. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also Goebel, supra note 98.
105. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 99.
106. Goebel, supra note 98, at 307-08. For a comprehensive review of EU law as compared to that of the United States, see id.
107. Babb, supra note 74, at 554.
108. Davis, supra note 9.
109. Id.
110. Babb, supra note 74, at 554 (citing Marvin Comisky & Phillip C. Patterson, The
Case for a Federally Created National Bar by Rule or by Legislation, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 945
(1982)).
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law defining permissible multijurisdictional practice and providing
consistency among the states.111
While the validity of these suggestions is not questioned, the political reality in the United States presents problems that did not exist in the EU. True uniformity as described above would require taking almost all control away from the states, thereby revoking a
precedent that has existed since the beginning of our nation’s history. Under the national regulatory theory, regulating lawyer activity would become the sole province of the federal government. National rules also inevitably would conflict with state rules of professional conduct relating to rules regulating other aspects of professional conduct. Thus, not only would the national bar be creating national rules with regard to multijurisdictional practice, but it would
also likely be forced to create national rules of ethics governing all
areas of lawyer regulation. The states would no longer have control
over what goes on within their boundaries involving their law.
In addition to infringing upon state autonomy, a uniform standard
could jeopardize lawyers’ independence by subjecting them to increased political pressures and control from a national bureaucracy.112 Moreover, the actions required to revoke the states’ longstanding constitutional right are so involved and complicated that it
is extremely unlikely that states and a newly created national bar
could come to any kind of consensus.113 State representatives and
regulators would have to be able to provide input.114 There would be
no consensus as to who should create the national bar and who
should run it. Such an extreme step is probably neither an appropriate nor a feasible step to take.115
Additionally, a national system could too greatly increase the ease
of crossing state borders. A “race to the bottom” effect could occur in
which lawyers would choose to take a bar exam with the least stringent requirements, leaving open the ability to practice in another
state.116 Alternatively, lawyers who are unable to pass one state’s examination would simply take the examination of another jurisdiction.117 Upon successful completion, that lawyer could easily practice
in the first state, thus undermining the state’s right to regulate in
the first place.118 Because of the problems inherent in nationalizing
our existing system of UPL, the most feasible alternative will likely
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Green, supra note 1.
Babb, supra note 74, at 554-55.
ABA Section of Litigation, supra note 64.
Id.
Id.
Babb, supra note 74, at 554.
Id.
Id.
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be state-based reform adapted more to the current state of the profession.
B. State-Based Reform
The more practical approach to reform is to ensure state autonomy—leave the ultimate regulatory authority to the states.119 States
are better equipped to determine appropriate regulation of the legal
profession in their provinces and have done so for decades.120 Although multijurisdictional practice is becoming prevalent in our society, there is no reason that reform cannot be adequately handled, if
not best handled, by the states. The quest for reform cannot, however, stop at this conclusion. Problems with current UPL regulations
are rampant, and state-based reform is available in a multitude of
forms. Below are the most commonly recommended forms of statebased reform. This discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive
list of those remedies available; however, one of the following or a
combination of the following will likely best suit the country.
1. Redefine the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Amend
Disciplinary Rules Accordingly
Perhaps the simplest solution to current UPL problems is to redefine UPL.121 This solution requires the least effort from the states,
while allowing them to maintain the most control over lawyer regulation.122 A new definition would differentiate between persons licensed
in other states and those with no legal experience.123 A lawyer licensed and in good standing in another jurisdiction would not automatically be disqualified from practicing within the state. The definition of unauthorized practice would allow for changes in the nature
of legal services, and lawyers then would be aware of when they
could be violating the rules.
Amended rules also would include “safe harbor” provisions.124
These provisions would address all areas specific to current multijurisdictional practice, such as separate subsections relating to,
among others, in-house counsel, prelitigation activities, or alternative dispute resolution. Some states have recommended a safe harbor
type of reform in addition to registration. For example, California’s
task force recommended that a safe harbor approach apply when an
119. For a useful starting point to address such reform, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
§ 3 (1998).
120. Zacharias, supra note 95, at 375.
121. Davis, supra note 9.
122. Creamer, supra note 2.
123. Id.
124. Lundy, supra note 3; see also Rocco Cammarere, Caution: MJP Curves Ahead, 10
N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER 656 (Apr. 9, 2001).
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
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attorney’s involvement is too brief or infrequent to justify completion
of a cumbersome registration process.125
The second step to this level of reform is to amend the disciplinary
rules in accordance with the new definition. Disciplinary rules relating to out-of-state lawyers would not be the same as those relating to
laypersons. Further, they would take into account the differences
lawyers face in their multijurisdictional practice. Such rules would
explicitly provide when a lawyer is subject to professional discipline
in any state in which that lawyer practices.
2. Registration or Green Card Admission
Alternatively, states could implement a state registration system
under which an attorney need only register to practice law within a
new jurisdiction.126 States could maintain a list of attorneys admitted
under such status and regulate them accordingly.127 Registering attorneys also would be subject to a character investigation, and attorneys or others from the registering attorney’s licensed state would be
invited to comment on the applicant. This process would be similar to
the current registration process of attorneys who take the local bar
exam. Additionally, unlike pro hac vice rules, registered attorneys
would not be limited in the amount of services they would be able to
provide in that jurisdiction. By registering, however, they would subject themselves to discipline for violation of any local rule of professional conduct in that state.128
An alternative and less drastic approach to reach the same solution would allow attorneys to register for temporary admission status
within the state.129 An attorney would then be effectively “licensed” to
practice law within the state on a temporary basis. However, such a
limited proposal does not fully take into account the current problems of UPL regulations. While it would be somewhat more flexible
in supporting multijurisdictional practice, it would not remedy the
problem for long. Lawyers often cannot predict or control the amount
of work to be done in a new jurisdiction.
One state committee studying the need for multijurisdictional
practice reform has proposed this type of reform. The California Task
Force on Multijurisdictional Practice has recommended registration
as one approach for determining out-of-state lawyer admission to
125. New Report Proposes Changes in Rules on Out-of-State Lawyers, Cal. Judicial
Council News Release, at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/newsreleases/NR49-01.htm (Aug. 1,
2001) [hereinafter New Report].
126. Babb, supra note 74, at 555-56.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional
Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 702 (1995).
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provide legal services in California.130 The process, as proposed,
would not require an out-of-state attorney to pass the California bar
exam. Rather, an attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction
would be permitted to practice law in California on an ongoing basis.131 The task force suggests that this form of UPL reform should
apply primarily to in-house counsel residing, but not licensed, in
California.132
3. Relaxed Reciprocity/Admissions Standards
Currently, the majority of states do not have uniform reciprocity
standards.133 Reciprocity between states permits attorneys to be admitted to practice within the state simply by being in good standing
in their licensed jurisdiction. This alternative is quite similar to the
registration requirement except that the attorney would not be subject to a stringent character investigation, nor would the attorney
have to complete a time-consuming registration process. Under this
standard, the attorney’s admittance is contingent upon a reciprocal
arrangement with the state from which the attorney is licensed. If
that state would allow the same reciprocity to its attorneys, then the
state to be entered will do the same. Fifteen jurisdictions presently
operate under this criterion.134 Additionally, thirteen jurisdictions allow lawyers to practice within their state without requiring other
states to reciprocate.135 These attorneys need only meet the conditions developed by the state.
This reciprocal approach just described was the original purpose
for implementing the multistate section of the bar exam. By initially
passing this section when becoming licensed in their home state,
lawyers should be permitted easier access to practice within other
states. However, as shown above, while states implemented the
multistate section, most states did not fulfill the other end of the
bargain.
Finally, the Attorney’s Liability Assurance Society has developed a
proposal known as “green card” admission.136 Under this concept, lawyers who have remained in good standing in their home state would
receive a card permitting them to practice in another state. The lawyer

130. New Report, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Basic Reciprocity by Jurisdiction, at http://www.crossingthebar.com/
Reciprocity-Chart.htm (last edited Feb. 1, 2002).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Cammarere, supra note 124.
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would also be required to present a certificate of good standing, file a
statement by two sponsors, and pay an annual fee.137
4. CLE Credit/Seminars
This approach would not require an entering attorney to take the
state bar examination. Rather, the attorney would be required to
take an established number of seminars, similar to CLE seminars, on
local law relating to their practice area to qualify for admittance
within the jurisdiction. To ensure adequate completion of these
seminars, the attorney could be required to take some sort of quiz at
the end. Upon successful completion of these seminars, the attorney
would be permitted to practice in the particular area of law for which
he registered.
5. Change in Pro Hac Vice Rules
Currently, pro hac vice rules apply only to counsel who must appear in a court of foreign jurisdiction. These rules could be expanded
to apply to other prelitigation activity and ADR activity.138 However,
this alternative is probably not the most appropriate as the restrictions imposed by pro hac vice admittance may be too time-consuming
and unnecessary with regard to these activities.139 Safe harbor provisions may better resolve such activities.140
6. Assistance From Local Counsel
Another arrangement to justify more flexibility to admit attorneys
into a foreign jurisdiction is to require that the attorney obtain assistance from local counsel.141 This would ensure that the foreign counsel has a knowledgeable and “competent” attorney to assist the lawyer with regard to local rules. Because local rules as complex as confidentiality or disclosure requirements vary substantially among jurisdictions, a local attorney could ensure a foreign attorney’s compliance. Of course, as stated previously, firms could simply use local
counsel as a “front man,” thereby requiring his client to pay for counsel yet never consulting with him.142 Additionally, if such a rule were
implemented, states would have to determine the point at which foreign counsel is sufficiently competent to handle cases within the ju-

137. Id.
138. ABA Section of Litigation, supra note 64.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. For example, some states (albeit inconsistently) require attorneys to obtain assistance from local counsel for pro hac vice admission into the state. Jarvis, supra note 60.
For criticism of such requirements, see id.
142. Wolfram, supra note 129, at 677.
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risdiction on his own. Once the attorney has handled enough cases,
he or she will be sufficiently aware of local rules, rendering the justification for local counsel obsolete.
7. Waiving Into the Bar
Allowing an attorney to “waive” into the state bar is similar to a
reciprocity arrangement without the requirement to reciprocate.
Currently, Virginia permits an attorney to waive into its bar upon
completion of various administrative tasks and a showing that they
have practiced law in another jurisdiction for the past five years and
are in good standing.143
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The primary purpose of this Article is to address the necessity of
reforming current UPL regulations and to discuss possible solutions.
From my research of this topic, however, I will generally discuss my
suggestions of concepts that must be specifically addressed in a new
rule. Of course, while each state will likely propose many different
variations of reform in the coming years, this Article addresses the
importance of certain factors that must be considered. For persons
interested in drafting a concrete rule, official organizations studying
this subject have proposed such formally worded rules. On the same
note, other organizations have provided useful critiques of these proposals.144
First, I do not believe in the need for the creation of a national bar
or for a uniform rule relating to UPL. Such reform would detrimentally impact a state’s individual authority to regulate itself. A state
must maintain the ability to recognize the particularities of its legal
profession—most of which differ substantially from one state to another. This being said, in the process of implementing reform, states
should recognize that their rules must be able to coexist with similar
rules of other states; otherwise the entire purpose of multijurisdictional reform would be defeated. The rule should also provide which
state’s disciplinary rules will apply to the entering lawyer.
A reformed rule must adequately define what the state believes to
constitute the practice of law and what is unauthorized. In so doing,
different rules should be implemented with regard to the type of person affected—a lawyer not licensed in the state or a layperson. One
broad rule cannot apply equally to two drastically different scenarios.
Regarding unlicensed lawyers, the state should carefully balance the
143. Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, supra note 69.
144. Copies of these proposals or links to various websites have been compiled at
http://www.crossingthebar.com. These proposals and critiques would be extremely useful to
states in addressing reform in their jurisdictions.
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needs of our current society with the ultimate goal of permitting only
competent lawyers to practice law. Of course, such a goal entails a
careful scrutiny of what constitutes a “competent” lawyer. This definition differs substantially depending upon the source of the inquiry—some could even argue that a state license still does not necessarily make all lawyers competent.
A reformed rule must also take into account the various types of
lawyers affected. A separate subsection should be devoted to each
distinct category of practice so that all avenues of legal activity are
considered. States should recognize the important distinctions among
different categories of lawyers and permit or restrict activity specific
to each category. Only under this method will an attorney truly be
aware of when he or she is violating a rule of professional conduct by
entering another jurisdiction, be it directly or indirectly.
Safe harbor provisions should also be included. Such provisions
can provide restrictions or protections to activity that is difficult to
include in a subsection outlining the rule’s application to different
types of legal activity. Safe harbors would provide the final clarity
needed to adequately inform attorneys as to permitted conduct and
restrictions to ensure that the rules are not subject to abuse.
Reformed rules should take into account the interests of the state,
lawyer, and client. Lawyers should be required to inform current or
potential clients that they are not formally licensed in a particular
jurisdiction. Clients should be aware that their lawyer could ultimately bill more hours in order to become competent in the law of
another jurisdiction. Lawyers should also notify their clients of the
different admission laws of the jurisdiction to be entered. Overall, the
client must make an informed decision as to whether he or she will
be adequately benefited by the choice to retain an attorney not licensed in the pertinent jurisdiction.
Current UPL regulations are not only unclear as to what conduct
is prohibited—they are outdated. Ultimately, states may conclude
that more than one UPL regulation is necessary to address the current situation. This area must be reformed, but such reform must
make clear that, although the new rules may more flexibly permit
unlicensed lawyers to practice within a foreign state, a lawyer is not
entitled to simply enter another state as he or she desires and open a
practice. Rather, lawyers should be permitted to develop their
practices as their practices require in today’s society without circumventing the valid reasons for regulation. Reformed rules should not
only recognize that lawyers needs are changing, but they should also
be drafted in a way where they cannot be abused. Finally, the rule
must be detailed and unambiguous. Whatever method the states

1366

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1339

choose, they must include enough guidance so that lawyers know
their boundaries and precisely how they may proceed.
VI. THE NEXT STEPS
While this Article focuses on the need for reform of UPL regulations, the next step is for states to establish more uniform disciplinary rules. For the legal profession to in fact succeed in its quest to
adhere to our changing society, rules of professional conduct governing the legal profession must not be so diverse as to indirectly impede
a lawyer from effectively practicing in another jurisdiction, as his
practice requires and as that state’s multijurisdictional rule permits.
States should have the ultimate authority to regulate the profession
as is needed within a particular state; nonetheless, states should
somehow implement a method to inform entering attorneys of the
rules governing that state—to comply with the boundaries of that
state’s multijurisdictional rule.
Additionally, international law is increasing at much the same
pace as multijurisdictional practice. While this Article focuses on the
needed reform within the United States, firms are also expanding
their practices internationally. International reform will require cooperation with various countries, and developments are already underway.145 For large firms representing corporate clients, they now
have no choice. They must adapt to the companies’ desire to “go
global.” Other firms will inevitably follow suit. Even small clients
have activities that cross state lines. These clients should not be required to obtain separate legal assistance for each matter in separate
states. If the ultimate purpose is to protect the consumer, then the
consumer should be able to make the choice. The United States is
one of the most progressive nations in the world. The legal profession
should adapt to changes that society necessitates, effectively balancing the need for regulation of the profession with the rights or needs
of lawyers to as well “go global.”

145. See, e.g., Edward J. Cleary, Crossing State Lines: Multijurisdictional Practice, 57
BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 29 (2000) (discussing how NAFTA and GATT “have made it easier
for ‘lawyers from one signatory state to open offices and practice their own national law
within the other member states’”); see also Davis, supra note 9.

